American Civil War

C

The Secession Crisis

In the presidential election of 1860, a split in Democratic party ranks resulted in the nomination by the Southern wing of John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky and the nomination by the Northern wing of Stephen Douglas. The newly formed Constitutional Union party, reflecting the compromise sentiment still strong in the border states, nominated John Bell of Tennessee. The Republicans nominated Abraham Lincoln on a platform that opposed the further expansion of slavery and endorsed a protective tariff, federal subsidies for internal improvements, and a homestead act. The Democratic split virtually assured Lincoln's election, and this in turn convinced the South to make a bid for independence rather than face political encirclement. By March 1861, when Lincoln was inaugurated, seven states—South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas—had adopted ordinances of secession, and the Confederate States of America, with Jefferson Davis as president, had been formed.

In his inaugural address, Lincoln held that secession was illegal and stated that he intended to maintain federal possessions in the South. On April 12, 1861, when an attempt was made to resupply Fort Sumter, a federal installation in the harbour at Charleston, South Carolina, Southern artillery opened fire. Three days later, Lincoln called for troops to put down the rebellion. In response, Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee also joined the Confederacy.

D

Resources of North and South

Neither the North nor the South was prepared in 1861 to wage a war. With a population of 22 million, the North had a greater military potential. The South had a population of 9 million, but of that number, nearly 4 million were enslaved blacks whose loyalty to the Confederate cause could hardly be assumed. Although they initially relied on volunteers, necessity eventually forced both sides to resort to a military draft to raise an army. Before the war ended, the South had enlisted about 900,000 white males, and the Union had enrolled about 2 million men (including 186,000 blacks), nearly half of them towards the end of the war.

In addition, the North possessed clear material advantages—in money and credit, factories, food production, mineral resources, and transport—that proved decisive. The South's ability to fight was hampered by chronic shortages of food, clothing, medicine, and heavy artillery, as well as by war weariness and the unpredictability of its black labour force.

Even with its superior manpower and resources, however, the North did not achieve the quick victory it had expected. To raise, train, and equip a massive fighting force from inexperienced volunteers and to find efficient military leadership proved a formidable and time-consuming task. The South, with its stronger military tradition, had more men experienced in the use of arms and produced an able corps of officers, including Robert E. Lee. Only through trial and error did Lincoln find comparable military leaders, such as Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman.

III

Hostilities

The Confederacy enjoyed a certain advantage in conducting defensive operations on familiar terrain. If the South could keep its army in the field until the North lost the will to fight, the Confederacy would win the war. In contrast, the North needed to attack on a broad front and sustain long avenues of communication and supply.

Whereas the South merely had to defend itself, the North needed to destroy the South's capacity to make war and compel total surrender. The strategy for achieving this goal that was most popular with the Northern press, the public, and political leaders called for a direct overland march on Richmond, Virginia, the Confederate capital. They believed that the fall of Richmond would demoralize the South and bring the war to a rapid close. Lincoln's military advisers, however, convinced him to implement the “Anaconda Plan”. Devised by General Winfield Scott, it called for the establishment of a naval blockade around the Confederacy to prevent the importation of supplies from Europe, followed by an invasion of the Mississippi Valley to cut the Confederacy in half.

Confederate leaders also differed on the most effective strategy. Davis thought in terms of a defensive war that would wear down the North, attract foreign sympathy and support, and result in the acknowledgement of Southern independence. But the long, exposed frontier between the North and the South rendered such a strategy unrealistic. An alternate plan called for an offensive strike into the North before that section could mobilize its superior manpower and material goods. Those who advocated this strategy believed that the more prolonged the war, the less chance the South had of winning it.

A

The First Battle of Bull Run

The war began with both sides confident of an early victory. In May 1861, Union troops crossed the Potomac River, captured Alexandria, Virginia, and moved into north-western Virginia. The major Confederate army, some 22,000 men under the command of General Pierre G. T. Beauregard, was concentrated at Manassas Junction, Virginia, a key railway centre about 48 km (30 mi) south-west of Washington, D.C. Seeking to deliver a mortal blow to this army before reinforcements could reach it, General Irvin McDowell led a Union force of 30,000 towards Manassas. On July 21, in the First Battle of Bull Run, the Confederate troops, reinforced in time, won a resounding victory. The result was not strategically significant, but the setback forced a humiliated North to abandon hopes for a 90-day war and to raise a more substantial army. In contrast, the South left Bull Run with a sense of overconfidence that impeded proper preparation for the long conflict ahead.

B

McClellan's Appointment

After Bull Run, Lincoln replaced McDowell with General George B. McClellan as commander of the newly created Army of the Potomac. An able administrator and drillmaster, McClellan proceeded to reorganize the army for what he expected to be an overwhelming demonstration of Northern military superiority. Popular with his troops, the 34-year-old commander was also a conceited, arrogant man, contemptuous of the president and already suspect among Republicans because he vigorously opposed any tampering with the institution of slavery. Ultimately, his tendency to overestimate the enemy and his excessive caution wore out Lincoln's patience.