Nuclear Proliferation

Nuclear Proliferation, dissemination and use of nuclear weapons and military nuclear technology. The first use of nuclear weapons in war took place in August 1945, when the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. Atomic or fission bombs involve a self-sustaining atom-splitting chain reaction in a mass of uranium or plutonium, causing the release of a huge amount of energy in a very short time. Atom bomb design and construction is very precise, but it is now widely accepted that a competent nuclear physicist could glean all the information needed from readily available scientific literature. Most modern nuclear weapons are scientifically more advanced and belong in the second category of hydrogen or thermonuclear weapons. These weapons employ a fission explosion to create sufficient energy for the hydrogen fusion process to take place. There is then a massive release of energy, much larger than that from an atomic bomb. There is theoretically no limit to the size of a thermonuclear explosion.

From the moment nuclear weapon technology was revealed in 1945, it has been widely, though not universally, understood that these are not “weapons” in the traditional sense of conferring a viable military advantage on the possessor. When the use of nuclear weapons threatened to annihilate not just the belligerents in any conflict, but also to destroy and contaminate much of the Earth's surface, it seemed that weapons development had finally gone beyond the bounds of proportionality and utility. The British strategist Basil Henry Liddell Hart commented that “with the advent of atomic weapons, we have come either to the last page of war or the last page of history”.

A nuclear weapon involves a delivery system as well as the bomb or warhead. The first delivery system was the long-range bomber. As the Cold War progressed, so a wide variety of delivery systems were developed: missiles of various ranges launched from the air, ground, and sea; battlefield artillery; shipborne depth charges and torpedoes; and landmines. Nuclear weapon technology is now so diffuse that an effective means of delivery could be as simple as the boot of a car or the proverbial “suitcase bomb”. The yield or explosive force of nuclear weapons has also increased dramatically. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs had a yield of about 13 kilotons—equivalent to 13,000 tonnes of TNT explosive. The yield of some US and Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) was in the region of 1.5 megatons, or 1,500,000 tonnes of TNT. In 1962 the Soviet Union exploded a thermonuclear bomb with a staggering yield of 58 megatons. Nuclear weapons have also become extremely accurate: the “circular error probable” of a US MX missile is just 100 metres, meaning that there is a 50 per cent chance of the 11,000-kilometre-range missile delivering a warhead within 100 m of the target.

The first effects of a nuclear explosion are an extremely bright and hot wave of thermal radiation, and a massive blast, resulting in widespread destruction and fires. A series of electromagnetic pulses (EMP) are also released which, while not damaging to humans or buildings, could destroy communications systems. Nuclear radiation, extremely harmful to all forms of life, comes in the form of direct radiation at the time of the explosion, and radiation from radioactive fallout, the dirt and debris sucked up and irradiated during the explosion and falling back to Earth. It is possible to design weapons which augment one or other effect. Weapons designed to be used against military units might produce a high EMP in order to break down the military communications network. The best known special design was the so-called “neutron bomb”, or enhanced radiation/reduced blast bomb, which maximized lethal direct radiation to kill tank crews but which kept the blast effect to a minimum.

The United States had the monopoly in atomic bombs from 1945 until the first Soviet test in 1949. The US tested a thermonuclear bomb in 1952, and the Soviet Union followed suit one year later. In 1957 the Soviets launched the Sputnik satellite into the first global orbit using an intercontinental ballistic missile, prompting US fears of a 'missile gap'. Both sides then raced to produce bombers, missiles, and other means of delivery. By the end of the Cold War, each had well over 10,000 strategic (i.e. intercontinental) warheads, with many more in the sub-strategic range. Other acknowledged possessors of nuclear weapons are Britain, China, and France. In 1998 both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, confirming long-held suspicions that they too possessed a nuclear capability. Several states, such as Israel, are widely suspected of possessing nuclear weapons. Other suspected 'threshold' states, those thought to be capable of developing nuclear weapons, include Iran and North Korea. The dismantling of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme after the Gulf War revealed it to be well on the way to developing a nuclear device.

The “proliferation”, or spread of nuclear weapons has taken place in two ways, “vertical” and “horizontal”. Vertical proliferation is the expansion and development of existing arsenals, and is controlled through arms control agreements between the possessors. The prevention of horizontal proliferation is the object of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The regime has several elements, including national and multilateral export controls, inspection and verification agencies, bans on weapon testing, and, most recently, an attempt to prohibit further production of fissile material.

The key to the regime is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed in 1968. In essence, the NPT is a bargain in which non-nuclear states agree to renounce weapons-related research, development, and acquisition in exchange for access to civil nuclear technology. Nonsignatories, however, include Israel, India, and Pakistan: three states that have fought several wars in recent history. North Korea's threat to withdraw from the NPT in 1993, to avoid opening its nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), brought the counter-threat of a pre-emptive strike on the facilities by US bombers. The NPT, with 187 signatories as of December 2002, was the subject of a major international review conference in 1995 to meet its official expiry in May. The major powers possessing nuclear weapons, with permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council, secured indefinite continuation of the NPT regime by, among other proposed policies, promising concerted retaliation against any state guilty of nuclear attack or threats against an NPT signatory.

Many states criticize the NPT as discriminatory, and demand that the nuclear “haves” do more to meet their part of the bargain by working more conscientiously towards nuclear disarmament and complete test bans. The non-proliferation regime faces several other challenges. There is a fundamental difficulty in distinguishing between civil and military use of nuclear technology, and it seems increasingly difficult to control the traffic in key components and materials. It may also be that the taboo against the viewing of nuclear weapons as acceptable weapons of war has been eroded in various parts of the world. And it is not beyond the realms of possibility that a terrorist organization might eventually acquire and use its own bomb. In January 2003 North Korea announced its intention to become the first nation to withdraw from the NPT, having admitted to the pursuit of a secret nuclear programme and expelling United Nations nuclear inspectors the previous month.

In an important benchmark decision, the International Court of Justice of the United Nations ruled in July 1996 that the use of nuclear weapons in warfare was contrary to the rules of war, except in “extreme circumstances”. A ruling was initially requested in December 1994 by a large majority vote of the UN General Assembly, reflecting the concern of the non-nuclear majority at the possession of nuclear weapons by the “nuclear club” of permanent UN Security Council members. The decision rendered the use of tactical or theatre nuclear weapons illegal in any circumstances. Without an effective mechanism for enforcement, the decision is significant chiefly as a moral precedent.

See also Arms Control and Disarmament; Nuclear Testing.